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Abstract
Using survey data on debt management strategies, this paper studies whether the
probability that a country has a debt management strategy, publishes its debt strategy,
and uses a benchmark-based strategy is a¤ected by democratic accountability, institutional
quality, past debt crises/defaults, IFIs development assistance, and participation in debt
management programs. We nd that countries located in Latin America and Caribbean
are less likely to have developed a debt management strategy and, if they have, they are
less likely to publish it. In contrast, countries located in Middle East and North Africa
are less likely to use quantitative benchmarks in formulation of their debt management
strategy. A country is more likely to have developed a debt management strategy if it
has an experience of a past debt crisis, but not of repeated debt crises. Institutional
quality and democratic accountability could signicantly contribute to emergence of more
transparent and accountable debt management strategies in developing countries. IFIs
technical assistance on public debt management could be enhanced by IFIs conducting
their own, prior diagnostic reviews.
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1 Introduction
Governments have to often borrow in order to nance expenditures on public goods and
services that promote growth and increase nationswelfare. The government not only aims to
raise funding at low cost but also to structure the composition of its debt portfolio in such a
way as to minimize the impact of relevant shocks on its budget and medium-term expenditure
plan (see e.g. Gill and Pinto, 2005). Public debt managers are responsible for choosing the
appropriate borrowing instrument to raise the needed funds for the government, based on
the delegated authority from the government.1 The fundamental document that guides debt
managers in their decisions and operations is the public debt management strategy. The
strategy is built upon goals stated in the governments debt management objectives.2
If a given country has developed a debt management strategy, it may decide to publish
it. The debt management strategy is considered as public if it is published either in the
annual report of the debt management authority, or made available on its website. Further, a
formal debt management strategy, not necessarily published, can take two basic forms. Either
be presented in terms of guidelines or quantitative benchmarks for the optimal government
debt portfolio. The former relates to a document which guides the debt managers on types
of risks that should be considered as relatively more important, and thus indirectly points
to the desired structure of a debt portfolio. Therefore, the guidelines provide directions for
future debt management operations rather than quantitative targets. On the other hand,
strategic benchmarks state explicitly what are the desired risk characteristics of the optimal
debt portfolio in a quantitative manner.
This paper analyzes data from a survey on debt management strategies conducted by the
World Bank. The analysis focuses on three main aspects of debt management strategies in
surveyed countries. Namely, (i) whether a public debt management strategy has been devel-
oped by a given country, (ii) whether it is published, and (iii) whether it is formulated in
terms of guidelines or quantitative benchmarks. First, we describe the survey, summarize the
survey data statistics based on selected country group characteristics. Then, we investigate
whether the probability of having (i) a debt management strategy, (ii) a publicly disclosed
debt strategy, and (iii) a quantitative-benchmark strategy is a¤ected by democratic account-
1The process underlying delegation of authority to the debt management o¢ ce to borrow and execute
related transactions in nancial markets on behalf of the state is described in more detail in IMF and WB
(2001) and Wheeler (2004).
2The debt management objectives are usually expressed along the following lines, see IMF and WB (2001):
The main objective of public debt management is to ensure that the governments nancing needs and its
payment obligations are met at the lowest possible cost over the medium to long run, consistent with a prudent
degree of risk. The debt management objectives also typically contain sections addressing the governments
involvement in domestic bond market development and coordination of its actions with scal and monetary
policies. The latter relates to the fact that the objectives of scal policy, monetary policy, and public debt
management di¤er but there are various interdependencies among their policy instruments, see e.g. Wheeler
(2004) or Togo (2007).
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ability, institutional quality, past debt crises/defaults, IMF and World Bank development
assistance, and participation in debt management programs. We nd that the probability
that a country has developed a debt management strategy is decreased signicantly if the
country is located in Latin America and Caribbean, and increased signicantly if a country
has beneted from specic debt-management assistance from the IMF including an initial
diagnostic and follow-up technical assistance had an experience of a past debt crisis (but not
of repeated debt crises), and its overall institutional quality has improved. Further, we nd
that the probability that a country publishes its debt management strategy is negatively cor-
related with its location in Latin America and Caribbean and its participation in the DMFAS3
program, and that the major positive e¤ect on the choice to publish the strategy comes from
enhanced democratic accountability in the country. Finally, the probability that a country
uses quantitative benchmarks in formulation of its debt management strategy is signicantly
decreased if it is located in the Middle East and North Africa region, or have received IMF
technical assistance on public debt management. However, the most economically signicant
negative e¤ects appears to be due to increasing income beyond the thresholds for upper-
middle income and high income countries, while the most economically signicant positive
e¤ects are due to improved democratic accountability and specic development assistance
from the World Bank.
Development aspects concerning policy formulation of public debt management strategies
have not received much attention in the literature. This paper thus provides preliminary in-
sights in this area by using a new and unique data set. While development and formulation of
public debt management strategies has close ties to medium-term public expenditure frame-
works and scal sustainability (see e.g. Missale, 1999; and Burnside, 2004), the associated
literature has not paid a detailed attention to the role of debt management strategy formula-
tion. The academic literature has mostly focused on the tax-smoothing aspect (Sargent and
Wallace, 1981), and hedging of real and nancial shocks a¤ecting government nances (Bohn,
1990a and 1990b). Hence, the formulation of public debt management strategies has been
mostly addressed by practitioners and IFIs (e.g. Wheeler, 2004; IMF &WB 2001 and 2004),
however, a quantitative cross-country analysis of public debt management strategies and links
of their characteristics to country specics has been missing in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey de-
sign, the survey data collection and the data itself through the incidence of the surveyed
characteristics of debt management strategies conditional on selected country group charac-
teristics. Section 3 then carries out regression analysis to investigate the e¤ect of institutional
development, geographic location, past debt crises experience and development assistance on
the surveyed attributes of public debt management strategies across countries. Section 4
concludes.
3UNCTADs Debt Management Financial and Analysis System.
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2 The Survey Data
Progressing in the e¤orts to better understand the development economics of public debt
management strategies across di¤erent country groups and individual countries, the Banking
and Debt Management Department of the World Bank conducted a survey on public debt
management strategies. The survey was carried out during the period from August 2006
to February 2007 and covers OECD, IBRD and Blend countries.4 The questionnaire was
sent out to and completed by national authorities responsible for public debt management,
or if not feasible the questionnaire was completed by the relevant country economist based
on discussions with the relevant national government authorities. The information from the
questionnaire was supplemented by a search through websites of institutions responsible for
central governments debt management. The questionnaire asked the following questions5
(i) Has the government established a debt management strategy for the total central
government debt portfolio?
(ii) Is the debt management strategy document published?
(iii) Have you established a strategic target/benchmark for the total debt portfolio?
The questions were answered in a Yes/No manner and converted to 1=0 entries for each
country, respectively. Regarding point (i), due to the formulation of the question the positive
answers may include implicit strategies. After acquiring all observation, the data were re-
viewed and some adjustments made to ensure their consistency across countries.6 The latter
pertains to ensuring that the unobserved quality of debt management strategies which are
not made public meets certain criteria. Namely, the emphasis was placed on the fact that a
debt management strategy has to address the cost-risk trade-o¤, not only the cost of scal
nancing. This requirement thus excludes references to purely scal expenditure frameworks
or frameworks addressing scal sustainability. Concerning point (ii) the questionnaire was
supplemented by website search to obtain the strategy documents. In point (iii) all countries
that appeared to have at least one benchmark target or targeted range for one of the three
risks below qualied for a positive answer.
If countries have established a strategic target/benchmark for their public debt portfolio
they were asked which types of risks the strategic target/benchmark addresses. Namely, they
were asked
4The applied classication into country groups is that of the World Bank and is available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/
0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html
5The survey was made condential regarding the aswers of individual countries so that no country examples
appear in the text.
6 I am grateful to Lars Jessen and Antonio Velandia for their help in this process and Phillip Anderson,
Elizabeth Currie and Tomas Magnusson for their expert inputs.
4
(iii.a) Have you established a strategic target/benchmark for currency risk (% do-
mestic vs. % foreign)?
(iii.b) Have you established a strategic target/benchmark for interest rate risk (%
xed vs. % oating; average time to rexing (months); or modied or Macaulay
duration (years))?
(iii.c) Have you established a strategic target/benchmark for renancing risk (ceil-
ing on debt maturing within one year (% of total outstanding); or average time to
maturity (years))?
The Yes/No answers to the latter questions were also converted into 1=0 entries.
The entire data set covers 107 countries (see Table (7) in the Appendix) where the analysis
of question (i) is based on all 107 observations, and analyses of questions (ii) and (iii) on 68
observations on strategies. To broadly characterize our sample, the data shows that out of the
total of 107 countries, 68 countries have developed a sovereign debt management strategy; out
of the 68 countries with debt management strategies, 51 publish their public debt manage-
ment strategies. Furthermore, out of the 68 countries with debt management strategies, 39
formulate their strategies in terms of guidelines, and 29 in terms of quantitative benchmarks.7
Out of the 29 countries which formulate their debt management strategies using quantitative
benchmarks, 22 set benchmarks for renancing risk, 27 set benchmarks for interest rate risk,
and 19 set benchmarks for foreign currency risk. Furthermore, out of the 29 countries with
benchmark strategies, 14 set benchmarks for all three risk (renancing, interest rate and for-
eign currency), 11 set benchmarks for two of the risks, and 4 set a benchmark only for one of
the risks.
Regarding the source of information that provided the basis for our classication 40% of
countries responded to the questionnaire either by themselves or via the WBs country o¢ ce.
In the case of 9% of the countries, the information from diagnostic assessments conducted by
the Banking and Debt Management Department was used and updated by means of a website
search. Finally, 51% of countries were classied based on information from the relevant web-
sites, 46% of those are OECD countries and the remainder are countries for which a response
either to the questionnaire sent out directly to the relevant debt management authorities,
7The strategic benchmarks can quantify the targeted risk characteristics of the optimal debt portfolio either
in terms of specic magnitudes or more often specic ranges. For the purpose of this paper we consider three
basic types of risks: (i) foreign currency (FX) risk, (ii) renancing (roll-over) risk, and (iii) interest rate risk.
A benchmark for foreign currency risk species the desired currency composition of a debt portfolio, i.e. the
targeted shares of the debt denominated in domestic currency versus foreign currency. This benchmark could
be also specic on the targeted allocations of foreign currency debt across di¤erent currencies. A benchmark for
renancing risk includes the targeted maturity structure and redemption prole of the debt. And, a bechmark
for interest rate risk states the desired proportion of oating relative to xed interest rate debt or, in some
cases, the price-indexed debt.
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or to WBs country o¢ ces8 was not recovered. If none of the applied information channels
worked out the country was assigned a response of "No" to question (i), which excluded it
from the analysis of questions (ii) and (iii). There are 21 non-OECD countries that were
assigned a response of "No" in such a manner.
Next, we describe the survey data in more detail by focusing on selected country-group
characteristics. The latter include the income level classication, regional location, partic-
ipation in assistance programs regarding sovereign debt management and past experience
of sovereign debt crises. We use the World Banks methodology to classify countries into
groups with high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income and low income. Sim-
ilarly, we determine a countrys regional a¢ liation based on the classication used by the
World Bank by considering the regions of Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America
and Caribbean (LAC), East Asia and Pacic (EAP), South Asia (SAR), Middle East and
North Africa (MNA), and Subsaharan Africa (AFR). In terms of development assistance in
the area of sovereign debt management, we consider involvements of four providers: UNC-
TADs Debt Management Financial and Analysis System (DMFAS)9, COMSEC10, the World
Banks Diagnostics and Technical Assistance (WB-D, WB-TA)11 and the IMFs Diagnostics
and Technical Assistance (IMF-D, IMF-TA)12. For the World Bank and IMF assistance, we
thus distinguish between whether the institutions provided diagnostic or technical assistance.
Finally, we classify countries into groups which have experienced sovereign debt crisis in the
past and those who have not, and into groups that have experienced repeated sovereign crises
and others. To determine whether a country has experienced a sovereign debt crisis, we use
the dataset compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2008). When we condition on selected country
characteristics, we interpret the results as association not necessarily causality.
8The WBs country o¢ ces were asked to respond after a dialog with the relevant countrys authorities or
after a thorough assessment of the subject matter.
9UNCTAD project activities cover the provision of a specialized debt management software, the Debt
Management Financial and Analysis System (DMFAS), training and assistance in its e¤ective use, in particular
to enable debt o¢ cers to establish a complete and up-to-date debt database and to provide timely and accurate
debt statistics. They also cover maintenance and system support, the procurement of appropriate equipment
where necessary, advice on institutional and procedural issues, participation of government o¢ cials in DMFAS
training seminars, study tours for government o¢ cials to other DMFAS user countries, and support for debt
analysis and the development of debt management strategies.
10The Debt Management Section (DMS) of the Commonwealth Secreteriat implements the capacity build-
ing programme in debt management in its member countries, as an arm of the Special Advisory Services
Division of the Secretariat. The main objective of the debt programme is to assist countries in ensuring sus-
tainable debt management. In providing technical assistance on debt and development resource management
the DMS is focused on provision of the CS-DRMS software; assistance in data compilation; dissemination in
debt data methodology standards; software maintenance and support; training in debt and aid management;
and provision of policy advise on debt strategies and institutional structure for debt management.
11These are specic products and services provided by the Banking and Debt Management Department of
the World Bank.
12This is specic assistance provided by the Money and Capital Markets Department of the IMF.
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2.1 Incidence of Debt Management Strategies
Table (1) shows, in the rst column, the considered group characteristics. The second column
shows the di¤erence between the probability, Prob(:), that a country with a given group
characteristic, displayed in the corresponding row of column one, has a debt management
strategy, and the probability that a country without this group characteristic has a debt
management strategy, i.e. Prob(1) and Prob(0) respectively. For instance, the rst row
shows the di¤erence between the probability that a country located in the ECA region has a
debt management strategy, Prob(1), and the probability that a country outside of the ECA
region has a debt management strategy, Prob(0). The third column shows the Z-statistic
corresponding to this di¤erence, and column four shows the signicance level associated with
the Z-statistic. If the Prob(1) Prob(0) di¤erence is positive and the signicance level low
(e.g. below 5%), one can infer that there is a signicantly higher probability that a country
with the given group characteristic has a debt management strategy.
Table 1: Conditional Probability of Debt Management Strategy Incidence Based on Group
Characteristics
Group Prob(1)-Prob(0) Z-statistic Signicance Level
ECA 0:1602 1:4199 0:1556
LAC  0:2742  2:4970 0:0125
EAP  0:2521  1:5664 0:1172
SAR na na na
MNA  0:0919  0:5955 0:5515
AFR  0:1382  0:7766 0:4373
High Income 0:3555 3:2767 0:0010
Upper-Middle  0:1287  1:2771 0:2015
Lower-Middle  0:1685  1:7189 0:0856
Low Income na na na
DMFAS  0:0316  0:3090 0:0757
COMSEC  0:3183  2:5888 0:0096
WB 0:0419 0:4067 0:6841
WB-D&TA 0:0404 0:1426 0:8866
WB-D 0:0050 0:0412 0:9670
WB-TA 0:0712 0:5410 0:5884
IMF  0:1135  1:0913 0:2751
IMF-D&TA  0:3030  1:0695 0:2848
IMF-D  0:2135  1:1277 0:2594
IMF-TA  0:0977  0:9010 0:3675
Debt Crisis =1 0:1330  1:2894 0:1972
Debt Crisis >1  0:2391 1:0787 0:2807
The test results presented in Table (1) suggest that if a country is located in the LAC
region there is signicantly (at 5% level) lower probability that it will have a debt management
strategy. On the other hand, if a country belongs to the high income group there is signicantly
(at 1% level) higher probability that it will have a debt management strategy. Countries
belonging to the lower-middle income group have signicantly (at 10% level) lower probability
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of having a debt management strategy. In addition, countries that have taken part in the
COMSEC program have signicantly lower probability of having a debt management strategy.
There is also some indication that there is a lower probability that countries located in the
EAP region will have a debt management strategy but the signicance level of this di¤erence
still does not reach the conventional levels of signicance. The development assistance from
the World Bank, IMF or DMFAS does not seem to play a signicant role in a¤ecting the
probability that a country has developed a sovereign debt management strategy. Similarly,
a past debt crisis or repeated debt crises do not seem to coincide with the probability of a
country having developed a debt management strategy.
2.2 Incidence of Publicized Debt Management Strategies
Table (2) shows the considered group characteristics, similar to those in Table (1), in the
rst column. The second column shows the di¤erence in probabilities that a country with the
respective characteristic in column one publicizes its sovereign debt management strategy,
Prob(1), and the probability that a country without this group characteristic publicizes its
debt management strategy, Prob(0). If the di¤erence is positive country with the correspond-
ing characteristic is more likely to publish its debt management strategy. In column three
and four, one can nd the Z-statistic and signicance level, corresponding to the di¤erence in
probabilities shown in column one.
Table 2: Conditional Probabilities of Published Debt Management Strategies Based on Group
Characteristics
Group Prob(1)-Prob(0) Z-statistic Signicance Level
ECA 0:1594 1:2753 0:2021
LAC  0:2092  1:4047 0:1600
EAP 0:0333 0:1435 0:8858
SAR na na na
MNA  0:2413  1:2518 0:2106
AFR 0:0333 0:1435 0:8858
High Income 0:0500 0:4307 0:6666
Upper-Middle 0:0257 0:2091 0:8343
Lower-Middle  0:0775  0:6476 0:5172
Lower Income na na na
DMFAS  0:2454  2:0243 0:0429
COMSEC 0:1553 0:8629 0:3881
WB 0:0642 0:5366 0:5915
WB-D&TA 0:2903 0:8988 0:3687
WB-D  0:0641  0:4451 0:6561
WB-TA 0:2298 1:5429 0:1228
IMF 0:0625 0:4917 0:6228
IMF-D&TA 0:2857 0:6304 0:5283
IMF-D 0:2950 1:1097 0:2670
IMF-TA 0:0190 0:1435 0:8858
Debt Crisis =1  0:1039  0:8872 0:3749
Debt Crisis >1  0:2258 0:6990 0:4845
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The results in Table (2) suggest that the probability that a country, which has participated
in the DMFAS program, publishes its debt management strategy is signicantly lower than
the similar probability for remaining countries. This result appears to be signicant at the
5% level. Although the results for the LAC and MNA regions show lower probability that the
respective countries publish their debt management strategies, the results are not signicant
at common levels. Similarly, the income-group a¢ liation also does not seem to be associated
with the probability that a country publishes its debt management strategy. The development
assistance does not appear to play a role either. In addition, the experience of a past debt
crisis or repeated debt crisis does not indicate any association with the probability that a
given country would be more likely to publish its debt management strategy.
2.3 Incidence of Debt Management Strategies Formulated as Quantitative
Benchmarks
Table (3) shows considered group characteristic in column one, and the di¤erence between
the probability that a country with the given group characteristic has developed a bench-
mark strategy, Prob(1), and the probability that a country without this group characteristic
has developed a benchmark strategy, Prob(0). Columns three and four then provide the
corresponding Z-statistic and signicant level for such a di¤erence. A signicantly positive
di¤erence would imply that a country with a given group characteristic has signicantly higher
probability of having developed a benchmark-based sovereign debt management strategy.
The results shown in Table (3) imply that no considered group characteristic seems to
be signicantly associated with the probability that a country have developed a benchmark
strategy. Although there appears to be a lower probability that countries in MNA region have
developed a benchmark debt-management strategy, this result is not statistically signicant
at common levels. Similarly, countries that have received IMF technical assistance on public
debt management could show lower probability of having a benchmark strategy, but this result
is signicant at no less than the 13% level.
While the intention of this section has been to describe the survey data conditional on
selected country characteristics, the next section will investigate the marginal e¤ects of a
broader set of country characteristics on the probability that a country has a debt manage-
ment strategy, that it publishes its strategy, and that the strategy is formulated in terms
of quantitative benchmarks. This investigation will be carried out by means of a regression
analysis.
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Table 3: Conditional Probability of a Debt Management Strategy Beign in the Form of a
Benchmark Based on Group Characteristics
Group Prob(1)-Prob(0) Z-statistic Signicance Level
ECA 0:0869 0:6304 0:5283
LAC 0:0205 0:1252 0:9003
EAP  0:2000  0:7807 0:4349
SAR na na na
MNA  0:2988  1:4047 0:1600
AFR  0:2000  0:7807 0:4349
High Income 0:0333 0:2602 0:7946
Upper-Middle  0:0233  0:1723 0:8631
Lower-Middle  0:0132  0:1006 0:9198
Low Income na na na
DMFAS  0:1272  0:9513 0:3414
COMSEC  0:0100  0:0504 0:9597
WB 0:0575 0:4360 0:6628
WB-D&TA 0:0645 0:1810 0:8563
WB-D 0:0769 0:4841 0:6282
WB-TA 0:0205 0:1252 0:9003
IMF  0:1151  0:8201 0:4121
IMF-D&TA  0:4444  0:8888 0:3740
IMF-D 0:2404 0:8195 0:4124
IMF-TA  0:2231  1:5242 0:1274
Debt Crisis =1  0:1399  1:0831 0:2787
Debt Crisis >1  0:4516 1:2671 0:2050
3 Regression Analysis
In order to estimate the marginal e¤ects of democratic accountability, institutional quality,
experience of past debt crises, development assistance (IMF; WB) and participation in debt
management programs (DMFAS; COMSEC) on the probability that a country has developed
a sovereign debt management strategy, we resort to regression analysis. Namely, we try to
estimate the probability of a country having a debt management strategy, a published debt
management strategy and a benchmark-based debt management strategy, respectively, using
a logit model for the respective probabilities.
Let yi denote a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a country i has developed
a debt management strategy. We estimate yi as a function of selected variables Xi. If we
assume that F (Xi0) is the cumulative probability distribution function evaluated at Xi0,
where  is a vector of coe¢ cients to be estimated, then the likelihood function of the model
could be written as:
logL =
XN
i=1
fyi [logF (Xi0i)] + (1  yi) [1  logF (Xi0i)]g (1)
where the vector Xi includes binary variables to indicate whether a country i is classied
as high income (HIC), upper-middle income (UMIC), lower-middle income (LMIC) or low
income (LIC) according to the World Bank classication; whether a country i is located in
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Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), East Asia and Pacic
(EAP), South Asia (SAR), Middle East and North Africa (MNA), and Subsaharan Africa
(AFR); whether a country i is involved with UNCTADs Debt Management Financial and
Analysis System (DMFAS), COMSEC (COMSEC); or whether or not it has received develop-
ment assistance from the World Bank, in the form of Diagnostics and/or Technical Assistance
(WB-D, WB-TA), or from the IMF either in the form of Diagnostics and/or Technical Assis-
tance (IMF-D, IMF-TA). In addition to these variables, that we have utilized in Section 2 to
assess bivariate conditional probabilities, we include several other which are discrete random
variables. Namely, we include the Index of Institutional Quality (InstQuality) and Democratic
Accountability (DemoAccount) due to Kaufmann et al. (2008), and log of GDP per capita in
constant international dollars (logGDPpc; Central WB Database).
The slope coe¢ cients k;where k is the number of explanatory variables in the logit re-
gression, measure the linear impact of the k-th explanatory variable on the log odds ratio:
log
Pi
(1  Pi) =
XK
k=1
kXk;i (2)
where Pi = Prob(yi = 1jXi) is the probability that a given country has a debt management
strategy, publishes it debt management strategy and has a benchmark-based debt management
strategy, respectively, while conditioning on the vector of k explanatory variables. We are more
interested in the impact of the explanatory variables on Pi which depends on the initial values
of the explanatory variables Xi and their k coe¢ cients. Therefore, to assess the economic
magnitude of the relationship between explanatory variables and the Pi, we will evaluate the
marginal impact at the sample mean as it is a common approach in the literature.
While the simplest logit model assumes iid disturbances, in practice, this assumption is
likely to be violated, for instance, due to possible omitted variables. Thus possible dependence
and heteroscedasticity of disturbances could lead to downward biased estimates of standard
errors of the coe¢ cients. To correct for the violation of the iid assumption, we compute
the coe¢ cient standard errors using a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust variance-
covariance (HAC) matrix.
It is assumed for the purpose of the regression estimation that all the explanatory variables
are weakly exogenous. In particular, the variables describing the geographic location of a
country are assumed to be strictly exogenous with respect to the characteristics of sovereign
debt management strategies. Further, the income level of a given country is assumed to be
weakly exogenous as cost-e¤ective and prudent public debt management would be one of
many potential factors e¤ecting the countriesincome level so that by principle of aggregation
there should be stronger causality from the income level variable to the debt management
variable rather than the other way around. We assume the same degree of weak exogeneity
for the variables characterizing overall Institutional Quality and Democratic Accountability
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of the country since public debt management quality or accountability would be one of many
aspects potentially a¤ecting those two ratings.
A question arises of whether the assumption of weak exogeneity is a reasonable one in the
case of debt management crises and development assistance. This is because one can argue
that the weaker the public debt management the more likely the occurrence of a debt crisis or
the more likely that a country would ask for a development assistance in this area. Although
we made an attempt to adjust for this possible bias in the estimation, we were not able to
nd suitable instruments to tackle this potential problem e¤ectively. Therefore, the presented
estimation results should be approached with this caveat in mind.
3.1 The Probability That a Country Has a Debt Management Strategy
In this section, we estimate the discussed logit model for a binary variables taking value of
one when a given country has a sovereign-debt management strategy and zero otherwise.
The estimation results are reported in Table (4). We report the parsimonious version of
the estimation results based on the general-to-specic approach maximizing the adjusted R
squared. Namely, the rst column shows the utilized explanatory variables, the second column
shows the estimated k coe¢ cients from equation (1), column three reports the k-coe¢ cients
robust standard errors estimated using the HAC matrix, column four reports the probability
that a given coe¢ cient is equal to zero, column ve shows the estimated unconditional mean
for a given variable, and column six shows the impact of a given explanatory variable at its
sample mean.
Table 4: Logit for Debt Management Strategies - Parsimonious Estimation Results
Variable k Robust S:E: Probab: Xk;i kXk;i
ECA 1:683 0:745 0:024 0:281 0:473
LAC  1:517 0:844 0:072 0:172  0:261
HIC 1:397 0:932 0:134 0:375 0:524
DMFAS 1:300 0:728 0:074 0:313 0:407
IMF 3:904 1:899 0:040 0:266 1:038
IMF-D  2:786 1:560 0:074 0:071  0:198
IMF-TA  4:275 1:791 0:017 0:276  1:180
DebtCrisis1 2:638 1:021 0:010 0:327 0:863
DebtCrisis2  1:577 1:137 0:165 0:051  0:080
InstQuality 1:245 0:506 0:014 0:384 0:478
Intercept  1:041 0:509 0:041 1:000  1:041
Observations 98
Pseudo R2 0:336
LogLikelihood  42:035
The estimation results suggest that if a country is located in the ECA region then this
increases the probability that the country has developed a sovereign-debt management strat-
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egy, where the estimated coe¢ cient at the sample mean equals 0:473 and is signicant at the
5% level. On the other hand, if a country were to be located in the LAC region its probabil-
ity of having a sovereign debt management strategy would decrease by 0:261, the coe¢ cient
estimate at the sample mean, signicant at the 10% level.
Further, if a country were to reach the income level of HICs, its probability of having a
debt management strategy would increase by 0:524, though this e¤ect is not signicant at
common levels. The e¤ect of participation in the DMFAS program increases the probability
that a country has developed a debt management strategy by 0:407, an estimate signicant at
the 10% level. If a country were to benet from an IMF program including debt management
diagnostic and subsequent technical assistance, its probability of having a debt management
strategy would increase by 1:038; an estimate signicant at the 5% level. In this case, it is thus
predicted that the country develops debt management strategy under such an IMF program,
conditioning on other variables. Nevertheless, if the IMF program includes only a diagnostic of
the countrys debt management this could decrease this positive e¤ect by  0:198, signicant
at the 10% level. Moreover, if the country were a subject to an IMF technical assistance
in the area of debt management without prior relevant diagnostics conducted by the IMF,
such assistance would decrease the probability that the country develops a debt management
strategy by an estimated  1:180 signicant at the 5% level. The overall e¤ect of such an
IMF-TA would thus be negative.
Consider now the e¤ect of past debt crises experience. The estimation results imply
that if a country has experienced a debt crisis in the past, its probability of having a debt
management strategy increases by estimated 0:836, signicant at the 1% level. Nevertheless,
if a country has experienced repeated debt crises in the past, i.e. more than one in our case,
this could decrease the positive e¤ect of crisis experience by an estimated  0:08. The latter
is however not signicant at common levels.
Finally, the estimated e¤ect of institutional quality on the probability that a country has
developed a debt management strategy appears to be signicantly positive at the 5% level.
Namely, if a country increases its rating on institutional quality by one, this would increase
its chances for developing a debt management strategy by an estimated 0:478.
Overall the regression shows a reasonable t with a pseudo R squared of 0:336 where
the most inuential variables to increase countriesprobability of having a debt management
strategy are: (i) specic debt-management IMF assistance including both diagnostic and
technical assistance; (ii) experience of a past debt crisis, i.e. no experience of repeated debt
crises; and (iii) increasing overall institutional quality in the country.
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3.2 The Probability That a Country Publishes Its Debt Management Strat-
egy
This section contains a discussion of the estimation results from a logit regression for published
sovereign-debt management strategies. When estimating the regression, we start with the
same baseline set of explanatory variables as in Subsection 3.1., and by applying the general-to-
specic approach, we arrive at the parsimonious version of the estimated regression presented
in Table (5).
Table 5: Logit Regression for Publicized Debt Management Strategies - Parsimonious Esti-
mation Results
Variable k Robust S.E. Signif. Level Xk;i kXk;i
LAC  1:480 0:924 0:109 0:172  0:255
HIC  1:652 1:086 0:128 0:375  0:620
DMFAS  1:198 0:734 0:103 0:313  0:375
WB 1:126 0:743 0:130 0:328 0:369
DemoAccount 1:013 0:543 0:062 0:535 0:542
Intercept 1:439 0:698 0:039 1:000 1:439
Observations 64
Pseudo R2 0:143
LogLikelihood  32:603
The estimation results suggest that when a country is located in the LAC region this
could signicantly decrease, by  0:255; the probability that it publishes its debt management
strategy. In other words, countries in LAC appear to be signicantly less transparent regarding
their applied public debt management strategies than other countries in our sample. In
addition, if a country were to increase its income level to that of HICs, it would decrease the
probability of publishing its debt management strategy by  0:620. This suggests that HICs
could be generally less transparent in their public debt management than countries with lower
income levels. The latter e¤ect is however not signicant at common levels.
Further, if a country were to join the DMFAS program, the probability that it will publish
its debt management strategy is predicted to decrease by  0:375. However, if a country were
to benet from specic WB assistance focused on public debt management, which would have
to include both initial diagnostic and subsequent technical assistance, the probability that it
will publish its debt management strategy is predicted to increase by 0:369. Although this
e¤ect is not signicant at the common levels, it signicantly improves the regressions t to
the data.
Finally, if overall democratic accountability were to improve in a given country the prob-
ability that this country will publish its debt management strategy will signicantly increase
by an estimated 0:542. Overall the model is only marginally successful in tting the data
with pseudo R squared of 0:143 where the major e¤ect on the choice of a country to publish
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its debt management strategy comes from an increase in overall democratic accountability in
the country.
3.3 The Probability That a Country Formulates Its Debt Management
Strategy Using Quantitative Benchmarks
In this section, we estimate the logit regression for a binary dependent variable taking the value
of one when a country has a debt management strategy expressed in terms of quantitative
benchmarks and zero otherwise. We start with the same set of explanatory variables as
in subsections 3.1. and 3.2. We have obtained the parsimonious estimation results shown
in Table (6) by applying the general-to-specic approach  using the maximization of the
adjusted R squared as the selection criterion.
Table 6: Logistic Regression for Benchmark-Based Debt Management Strategies - Parsimo-
nious Estimation Results
Variable k Robust S.E. Signif. Level Xk;i kXk;i
ECA  3:520 1:838 0:056 0:281  0:989
LAC  4:620 2:140 0:031 0:172  0:795
MNA  4:322 2:088 0:038 0:094  0:406
HIC  11:11 3:833 0:004 0:375  4:166
UMIC  4:339 1:686 0:010 0:297  1:289
COMSEC  5:411 2:341 0:021 0:109  0:590
WB 3:295 1:224 0:007 0:328 1:081
IMF  2:925 0:947 0:002 0:266  0:778
DemoAccount 4:857 1:570 0:002 0:535 2:598
Intercept 4:425 2:070 0:033 1:000 4:425
Observations 64
Pseudo R2 0:285
LogLikelihood  31:359
We nd that the location of a country in the ECA region signicantly decreases the proba-
bility that the country expresses its debt management strategy using quantitative benchmarks
by  0:989, signicant at the 10% level. Similarly, the geographic location of countries in the
LAC and MNA regions also predicts decreased probability that a country expresses its strategy
in terms of quantitative benchmarks by  0:795 and  0:406, respectively, both signicant at
the 5% level. It appears that the potential higher transparency and accountability associated
with benchmark debt management strategies is not favored by HICs. Namely, the estimation
results imply that as a country increases its income level the probability that it would opt
for a benchmark debt management strategy decreases by  4:166; an estimate signicant at
the 1% level. Furthermore, this e¤ect appears to start at the level of upper MICs where
countries reaching the corresponding level of income signicantly (at the 1% level) decrease
their probability of adopting benchmark strategy, by  1:289.
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What concerns the development assistance e¤ect on the character of debt management
strategies, the results appear to be mixed. On one hand, if a country participated in the
COMSEC program or beneted from an IMF assistance, either a specic debt management
diagnostic review or technical assistance, its probability of opting for a debt management strat-
egy based on quantitative benchmarks would decrease by  0:590 and  0:778, respectively,
estimates signicant at the 5% and 1% level. On the other hand, if a country were to benet
from either a diagnostic review or technical assistance from the World Bank the estimation
results predict an increase in probability of that country developing a benchmark-based debt
management strategy by 1:081, signicant at the 1% level.
Moreover, the results suggest that there is a strong e¤ect of the overall Democratic Ac-
countability in the country on the choice between guidelines-based and benchmark-based debt
management strategies. Namely, the estimated regression predicts that as a country improves
its Democratic Accountability rating, it is signicantly more likely to opt for a debt man-
agement strategy based on quantitative benchmarks rather than (more general) guidelines,
ceteris paribus. This implies that benchmark debt-management strategies could also increase
the transparency and accountability of sovereign debt managers.
Overall, the regression shows a data t characterized by an R squared of 0:285, where
the most economically signicant negative e¤ects on the probability that a country would
adopt a benchmark-based debt management strategy appear to come from increasing income
beyond the thresholds of upper-MICs and HICs, respectively. And, where the most economi-
cally signicant positive e¤ects appear to come from the improvement in overall democratic
accountability in the country and the development assistance from the World Bank targeting
public-debt management.
4 Conclusion
This paper described and analyzed data from a survey on public debt management strategies
conducted by the World Bank. Namely, the paper focused on characterizing and estimating
the probability that a country has a debt management strategy, that a country publishes its
debt strategy, and that a country formulates its debt management strategy using quantitative
benchmarks. We attempted, in particular, to estimate how the aforementioned attributes of
sovereign debt management strategies vary with respect to countriesratings on democratic
accountability, institutional quality, experience of past debt crises, experience with drawing
on IMF or World Bank assistance, and participation in debt management programs, such as
DMFAS and COMSEC. These estimations were undertaken in an attempt to acquire some
understanding of the development aspects of public debt management strategies and their
link to broader institutional development, and to help developing countries benchmark their
position concerning the public debt management strategy to their peers and more e¤ectively
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demand respective development assistance.
Concerning the probability that a country has developed a debt management strategy, we
nd, that a location of a country in the LAC region signicantly decreases its probability of
having developed a debt management strategy based on both the evidence from conditional
bivariate analysis and regression analysis. Based on the performed regression analysis, we
nd that the most inuential variables to increase countries probability of having a debt
management strategy are: (i) specic debt-management assistance from the IMF including
both initial a diagnostic and follow-up technical assistance; (ii) a countrys experience of a
past debt crisis, but not of repeated debt crises; and (iii) overall enhancement of institutional
quality in the country.
Next, the probability that a country publishes its debt management strategy is signi-
cantly negatively correlated with its location in the LAC region and its participation in the
DMFAS program - a result obtained from both the conditional bivariate analysis and regres-
sion analysis. The regression estimates further emphasize that a major positive e¤ect on the
probability that a country publishes its debt management strategy comes from an increase in
overall democratic accountability in the country.
Furthermore, a location of a country in the MNA region appears to signicantly lower
its probability of using quantitative benchmarks to formulate its debt management strategy.
Similarly, countries that have received IMF technical assistance on public debt management
show lower probability of using benchmark-based debt management strategies. The latter two
results came out signicant in both the conditional bivariate analysis and regression analysis.
The regression analysis further implies that the most economically signicant negative e¤ects
on the probability that a country has developed a quantitative-benchmark strategy come from
increasing income beyond the thresholds of upper-MICs and HICs, respectively. In contrast,
the most economically signicant positive e¤ects appear to come from the improvement in
overall democratic accountability in the country and specic development assistance from the
World Bank focused on public-debt management.
Overall, we may infer that enhancement of institutional quality and democratic account-
ability in developing countries could signicantly contribute to emergence of more transparent
and accountable practices underlying the formulation of sovereign debt management strate-
gies. In addition, the positive impact of development assistance from IFIs seems to be en-
hanced if the IFIs provide technical assistance based on their own, prior diagnostic reviews of
sovereign debt management in a given country.
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5 Appendix
Table 7: Countries Included in Conditional Bivariate and Regression Analyses
ALBANIA CZECH REPUBLIC IRAQ NAMIBIA ST . LUCIA
ALGERIA DENMARK IRELAND NETHERLANDS ST . V INCENT&GRENAD.
ANTIGUA&BARBUDA DOMINICA ISRAEL NEW ZEALAND SURINAME
ARGENTINA DOMINICAN REP. ITALY NORWAY SWAZILAND
ARMENIA ECUADOR JAMAICA PAKISTAN SWEDEN
AUSTRALIA EGYPT JAPAN PALAU SW ITZERLAND
AUSTRIA EL SALVADOR JORDAN PANAMA SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
AZERBAIJAN EQUAT. GUINEA KAZAKHSTAN PAPUA NEW GUINEA THAILAND
BELARUS ESTONIA KOREA PARAGUAY TRINIDAD&TOBAGO
BELGIUM FIJI LATVIA PERU TUNISIA
BELIZE FINLAND LEBANON PHILIPPINES TURKEY
BOLIVIA FRANCE LIBYA POLAND TURKMENISTAN
BOSNIA&HERZ. GABON LITHUANIA PORTUGAL UK
BOTSWANA GERMANY LUXEMBOURG ROMANIA UKRAINE
BRAZIL GREECE MACEDONIA RUSSIA URUGUAY
BULGARIA GRENADA MALAYSIA SERBIA USA
CANADA GUATEMALA MARSHALL ISL. SEYCHELLES UZBEKISTAN
CHILE HUNGARY MAURITIUS SLOVAK REPUBLIC VENEZUELA
CHINA ICELAND MEXICO SLOVENIA ZIMBABWE
COLOMBIA INDIA M ICRONESIA SOUTH AFRICA
COSTA RICA INDONESIA MONTENEGRO SPAIN
CROATIA IRAN MOROCCO ST .K ITTS&NEVIS
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